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My basic idea behind the case that became Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.1 (Virginia Pharmacy) was that the
emphasis under the First Amendment should be on the impact of denying consumers
access to useful information, rather than on the restrictions on the seller or would-be
speaker.2 Virginia Pharmacy involved a total ban on the advertising of the price of
prescription drugs by pharmacists.3 Pharmacists could advertise, and they could
compete on price for prescription drugs, but they could not tell anyone what they
were charging for a drug, unless the customer came into the store or called on the
phone.4 Many consumers were living on low or fixed incomes, and drug prices were
a significant part of their expenses, yet they were being denied access to the infor-
mation needed to find the most affordable drug that met their needs.5
At the time the case was filed, I had just begun to serve as the director of the
newly formed Public Citizen Litigation Group, with Ralph Nader as my boss. One
of our goals was to increase the availability and affordability of legal services for
ordinary people, and I had identified the total ban on all lawyer advertising as a
promising area to challenge. The prescription drug ban on price advertising was
chosen as our first advertising case because, while false advertising can be banned,
the Virginia law applied to useful information whose truth (accuracy) could easily
be verified. With a win here, we planned to move on to the lawyer advertising ban,
with an intermediate stop in a case in which the local medical society threatened to
discipline doctors if they provided factual information, such as where they went to
* Lerner Family Associate Dean for Public Interest & Public Service Law, George
Washington University Law School. Thanks to my former Public Citizen Litigation Group
colleagues, William Schultz and David Vladeck, for commenting on a draft of this Essay and
for their wise insights gathered from many years of experience in commercial speech cases
in a variety of contexts. My current colleague, Catherine Ross, also had a number of valuable
insights.
1 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
2 Alan B. Morrison, How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine: An Originalist’s
Recollections, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2004).
3 425 U.S. at 749–50.
4 See id. at 752.
5 Id. at 763.
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medical school, whether they were board certified in a specialty, whether they spoke
a foreign language, and whether they accepted Medicare and Medicaid. Thus, the
application of Virginia Pharmacy to lawyer advertising was not simply a side effect,
but where we hoped to end. And I was prepared for a question at oral argument on
that very subject, which came out in a somewhat different form than I had expected.6
In the years since then, people who knew of my connection to Virginia Phar-
macy would ask whether I was pleased with how the case had played out, especially
regarding lawyer advertising, which I took to mean the kind featured on late night
television. My answer was generally along the lines of not liking some aspects, but
that the ability of consumers to obtain important information from lawyer advertis-
ing far outweighed the sometimes outlandish ways in which the information was
conveyed. When the invitation to participate in this symposium arrived, I decided
to take the opportunity to look over the cases in the Supreme Court and the circuit
courts of appeals to see where they had taken the Virginia Pharmacy case and see
whether my answer was still, “No regrets.”
Before looking at those cases, I need to explain my criteria for regrets. Until
Virginia Pharmacy, commercial speech had no First Amendment protection, and
afterwards, particularly after Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York,7 it received substantial protection, although less than
political or ideological speech. Our argument in Virginia Pharmacy did not urge the
Court to create a lower category of speech, but that is how it ended up.8 When I was
asked about how the case had played out, the questions were not directed toward
whether the Court had given too little protection for commercial speech, but too
much. Therefore, in this Essay, I will not discuss cases in which I think the Court
restricted too much speech (often as applied to lawyers), but only the most signifi-
cant ones where it gave what I consider too much protection, i.e., the Court failed
to consider other important interests besides that of the speaker.
There is a second area that I have chosen to omit from any extended discussion.
This area involves cases in which a government agency has directed a person (generally
a business) to include additional information in an advertisement or other statement
that the business is required or has chosen to disseminate, referred to in some con-
texts as compelled speech.9 The information usually relates to a commercial activity
6 Justice Byron White asked me, “Well, I suppose Mr. Morrison, that your next case is
lawyer advertising?” When the laughter died down, the Justice, quite uncharacteristically,
said, “You don’t have to answer that question,” presumably because he thought he knew what
I was going to say. But he would have been wrong because my answer would have been, “No,
our next case is against doctors.” I also had a more substantive answer: “The principles in
this case would apply to rules on lawyer advertising, but the outcome would depend on the
specifics of the rule, the advertisement at issue, and the rationales for the ban or restriction.”
7 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
8 See id. at 562–63; see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985).
9 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650–51.
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of the business, and the argument is made that the commercial speech doctrine of
Virginia Pharmacy protects the business from having to make the additional state-
ment.10 The relevance of commercial speech to compelled disclosure first arose in
a case in which I was counsel for petitioner in the Supreme Court, Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio.11 The main issue was whether
Ohio could discipline a lawyer who advertised for women injured by a Dalkon Shield
by including a drawing of the device, which enabled many women to connect their
injuries to a particular device when they did not know its name because their doctor
has simply inserted it in them.12 The disciplinary authority also charged Mr. Zauderer
with failure to disclose that, under the law then in effect in Ohio, his statement that
there would be no cost to the plaintiff if she did not prevail, was incomplete.13 That
was because she might have been liable for the defendant’s costs (even though as
a practical matter in personal injury cases, defendants almost never made such a
claim).14 Zauderer prevailed on the drawing charge, but lost on the failure to dis-
close, even though there was no express requirement that he had not followed.15
In recent years, businesses have challenged agency disclosure requirements,
arguing that they cannot apply it to at least some categories of commercial speech.16
In my view, Virginia Pharmacy tells a government what it must allow businesses
to say, but has little, if any, relevance on what they must say that they would prefer
to omit. Thus, if commercial speech did not have First Amendment protection, and
a state chose to allow limited lawyer advertising, the Court in Zauderer would still
have upheld a rule requiring additional disclosures over a challenge that the First
Amendment did not permit compelled speech, although in other commercial settings
it might have been struck down.17 To me, the Central Hudson analysis has no place
in cases like that, and the main focus should be on the legitimacy of the basis on
which the government is imposing a form of compelled speech. That question would
be answered under the applicable statute, if an administrative action, or under other
provisions of the Constitution, such as the Equal Protection Clause. To be sure, the
same kind of inquiries as to the fit between ends and means found in Central
Hudson18 would likely be prominent in such a case, although not because it involved
10 See id.
11 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
12 Id. at 630–32, 647.
13 Id. at 633.
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 647–49, 650–52; see id. at 632–33 n.4.
16 See, e.g., Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 20–21 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(en banc).
17 See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 4, 20–21
(1986) (overturning an order requiring utility to include ratepayer solicitation in regular
billing envelope).
18 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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commercial speech. But whatever the analysis, the commercial speech doctrine from
Virginia Pharmacy should not, and normally does not, play a significant role in the
outcome. For that reason, I do not include those cases in my calculation of regrets.
I. MISAPPLICATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE AND WHY THEY HAPPEN
My first regret category involves those cases in which the Court applied the
four-part Central Hudson commercial speech doctrine19 in a way that gave what I
consider undue weight to the interest of the advertiser and too little weight to whether
the information was useful to the listener. Of course, any time that a court establishes
a multi-part test, its application in a given case is bound to provoke controversy.
Although I did not propose such a test in Virginia Pharmacy, I must assume some
responsibility for urging the adoption of a doctrine that has led to some unfortunate
results, mainly as applied to the promotion of tobacco products. For example, in
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,20 Massachusetts adopted regulations prohibiting
indoor, point-of-sale advertising of smokeless tobacco and cigars lower than five feet
from the floor of retail establishments located within 1000 feet of a school or play-
ground, as a means of limiting the impact of those ads on children.21 The Court noted
that the 1000-foot rule as applied to major cities had a very widespread impact,22 and
it doubted that the rule would have much of an impact on preventing underage use
of tobacco products other than cigarettes (which were covered by federal law23).
But the nub of why the Court found that the regulations violated the First Amend-
ment is summed up in these sentences:
We must consider that tobacco retailers and manufacturers have
an interest in conveying truthful information about their products
to adults, and adults have a corresponding interest in receiving
truthful information about tobacco products.
. . . .
In addition, a retailer in Massachusetts may have no means
of communicating to passersby on the street that it sells tobacco
products because alternative forms of advertisement, like news-
papers, do not allow that retailer to propose an instant transaction
in the way that onsite advertising does.24
19 See id.
20 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
21 Id. at 533–36.
22 Id. at 562–63.
23 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 (2012).
24 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 564–65.
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What the Court never asked was whether the signs conveyed any information
that was useful to consumers,25 beyond the fact that a particular brand of tobacco
products was for sale at a location where adults (the only legal buyers) almost cer-
tainly would know or assume that the products could be purchased there. And if they
did not know, all they had to do was walk in the door or ask the person right in front
of them. By contrast, in Virginia Pharmacy, we emphasized that consumers could not,
as a practical matter, obtain the highly useful information about where lower-priced
prescription drugs were sold so long as the advertisement ban was in place.26 I had
hoped that, as the commercial speech doctrine developed, the utility of the informa-
tion to the consumer would be part of the balance, instead of simply asking whether
the challenged statements were truthful. If there had been that balancing, some of the
cases might have come out differently, especially where the only information pro-
vided was the name of the product being sold, without even a mention of its price.
A further illustration, also in the tobacco context, of the willingness of courts to
find that the balance tips in favor of sellers, even when the disputed portions of the ad
provide no useful information, is the final portion of Discount Tobacco City &
Lottery, Inc. v. United States.27 Although the court largely sided with the government
in upholding the laws designed to prevent cigarette makers from influencing those
under age eighteen to try their products, it nonetheless concluded that “the provision of
the Act banning the use of color and graphics in tobacco advertising is vastly over-
broad,” citing Zauderer with respect to graphics.28 Had the court focused on the utility
of the disputed aspect of the advertisement, it would have distinguished Zauderer,
where the drawing of the IUD was found to be a significant factor in helping women
identify the product as the one that caused their injuries, and then connected them
with someone who was willing and able to represent them.29 By contrast, the color
and graphics here served no useful function to the consumer, although from the
manufacturer’s perspective, it supposedly helped to sell cigarettes.30
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT SHOULD PERMIT DISCOURAGING OF LEGAL,
BUT POTENTIALLY HARMFUL, ACTIVITIES
One approach that was followed for a brief time, but then was rejected, allowed
a state to impose some restrictions on commercial speech if it had a legitimate
25 See id. at 554–56 (using Central Hudson’s four-part test, which does not include
usefulness to consumer).
26 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
763–64 (1976).
27 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013).
28 Id. at 547–48, 569 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650–51 (1985)).
29 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 631, 647.
30 The plaintiffs in Discount Tobacco City argued the graphics served to “inform[ ] [con-
sumers] about their products . . . , including how to use novel products[.]” 674 F.3d at 546.
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interest in discouraging certain lawful activities. Thus, in Posadas de Puerto Rico
Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,31 the Court, by a 5–4 vote with conserva-
tives in the majority, upheld a law that prohibited casinos from advertising to locals
as a means of discouraging their legal patronage at gaming places.32 As then-Justice
William Rehnquist put it for the majority, “the greater power to completely ban
casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino
gambling[.]”33 The Court continued on that theme as follows:
It would surely be a Pyrrhic victory for casino owners such as
appellant to gain recognition of a First Amendment right to ad-
vertise their casinos to the residents of Puerto Rico, only to thereby
force the legislature into banning casino gambling by residents
altogether. It would just as surely be a strange constitutional
doctrine which would concede to the legislature the authority to
totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legislature the
authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or
activity through advertising on behalf of those who would profit
from such increased demand.34
However, that approach was specifically disavowed and rejected in 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island.35 As a result, the government is faced with the often-unpleasant
choice of making a product unlawful or placing no limits on its truthful promotion.
Thus, in Educational Media Co. at Virginia Tech v. Insley,36 the court struck down
a ban on advertising of alcoholic beverages in college newspapers where the majority
of the students were legally able to purchase alcoholic beverages, and not encourag-
ing its use was insufficient to override the sellers’ interest in getting out their
message.37 Similarly, in Nordyke v. Santa Clara County,38 the court set aside a gov-
ernment restriction contained in a fairgrounds lease that forbade the offering of guns
for sale on the premises, citing the language in Virginia Pharmacy that gave First
Amendment protection to speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction.39 The county amended its law to forbid only the possession of firearms
on the fairgrounds, and the court upheld that statute, even though it had the effect
31 478 U.S. 328 (1986), abrogated by 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484
(1996) (plurality opinion).
32 Id. at 330–33, 348.
33 Id. at 345–46.
34 Id. at 346.
35 517 U.S. 484, 508–14 (1996) (plurality opinion).
36 731 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2013).
37 Id. at 294, 298, 301–02.
38 110 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1997).
39 Id. at 708–10, 713 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
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(and perhaps the intent) of severely limiting the likelihood that anyone would actually
make a purchase there.40 Assuming that a state lessor can violate the First Amendment
by including speech related restrictions in its leases, it is by no means clear why the
state should not be allowed to impose non-discriminatory bans on the promotion of
certain dangerous products, instead of having to take the further step of banning them
entirely. No sensible person today would apply prohibition to cigarettes, but, espe-
cially for advertisements that convey no useful information, perhaps a state should
be permitted to take the lesser step of limiting advertisements and promotional mate-
rials as an alternative.
Consider two examples. In Passions Video, Inc., v. Nixon,41 the court sided with
the owners of adult cabarets and sexually oriented businesses that were barred from
having any form of advertising, with the exception of being allowed two exterior on-
premises signs if within one mile of a state highway.42 For a legal business not to be
able to tell the public its name and location was found to be excessive and not out-
weighed by the alleged secondary effects of “[improving] traffic safety, [limiting]
harm to minors, and [reducing] prostitution, crime, juvenile delinquency, deterioration
in property values, and lethargy in neighborhood improvement projects.”43 But the
same deprivation of basic information in the form of a law banning all advertising
of brothels in Nevada, including its name, location, or phone number, even in the
counties where prostitution was legal, was upheld in Coyote Publishing, Inc. v. Miller.44
The court purported to accept that Posadas was not good law, but it nonetheless up-
held the law with very much Posadas-like language: “Nevada also argues for an
exception specific to prostitution. We agree that there are strong reasons why the
sale of sexual services, in particular, ought to be treated differently than other adver-
tising bans on ‘vice’ activities.”45 It is perhaps understandable why the U.S. Supreme
Court declined to hear the case, but it is hard to argue with the newspaper plaintiffs
that they only sought to convey factually correct information that was useful to those
adults who were legally entitled to act on it.
There is one case which may illustrate the proposition that allowing commercial
speech to be given does not mean the public will accept the proposed commercial
transaction. In Ann Arbor, Michigan, as in most cities, a permit is required to operate
a restaurant.46 As a condition of getting the permit, the owner was forbidden from
using the name of its chain—“Sambo’s”—because it was seen as demeaning to
blacks.47 The Court of Appeals overturned that condition, even though it agreed that
40 Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1190–92 (9th Cir. 2003).
41 458 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 2006).
42 Id. at 839.
43 Id. at 842–44 (alterations in original) (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 226.531.5 (West 2004)).
44 598 F.3d 592, 596–97 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1217 (2011).
45 Id. at 600.
46 See Sambo’s Rests., Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 687 (6th Cir. 1981).
47 Id. at 687–88.
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the name was tasteless and offensive.48 The victory was for naught, as less than a
month after issued, Sambo’s filed for bankruptcy, and now all but one of its 1,117
outlets is no longer in operation.49
III. CORPORATE SPEECH, SEEN BROADLY
Depending on how Virginia Pharmacy is read, it can be made to seem responsi-
ble at least in part for the Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC,50 which upheld
the right of for-profit corporations under the First Amendment to make unlimited
independent political expenditures in connection with an election.51 Many of the
obvious beneficiaries of Virginia Pharmacy were pharmacies operating in corporate
form, and so the decision does at least hold that some forms of corporate speech
have constitutional protection. But even before Virginia Pharmacy, corporations had
some First Amendment rights. The New York Times is a corporation, and it was the
defendant in the most important libel case under the First Amendment, New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,52 in which the allegedly libelous speech was contained in a
paid advertisement.53 Moreover, the conduct at issue in Citizens United was not a
commercial transaction, but the payment to create a political movie attacking a
candidate for president, which presumably supplied information that was useful to
some voters.54 Seen from that perspective, Virginia Pharmacy is not to blame, but
that is not the end of the story.
Two years after Virginia Pharmacy, the Court heard First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti,55 a challenge to the Massachusetts statute that forbade corpora-
tions from making expenditures to support or oppose a ballot initiative, except where
the initiative would directly affect them.56 In setting aside the ban, the Court noted
that Virginia Pharmacy had held that the First Amendment did not permit the ban-
ning of all commercial speech by corporations.57 Citizens United, in turn, cited
Bellotti for the proposition “that First Amendment protection extends to corpora-
tions.”58 From there the end was not much in doubt, but that was mainly because the
Citizens United majority saw no difference between making a speech and spending
48 Id. at 694–95.
49 Chapter 11 Petition Filed by Sambo’s, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 1981), http://www.nytimes
.com/1981/11/28/business/chapter-11-petition-is-filed-by-sambo-s.html [https://perma.cc/NQK4
-EK9E]; SAMBO’S, http://sambosrestaurant.com/#home [https://perma.cc/9AHP-PPTH].
50 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
51 Id. at 365, 372.
52 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
53 Id. at 256–57.
54 558 U.S. at 319–20.
55 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
56 Id. at 767–68.
57 Id. at 783.
58 558 U.S. at 342 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14).
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millions on an advertising campaign.59 However, the blame for that step must go to
the Court’s pre–Virginia Pharmacy decision in Buckley v. Valeo,60 where the Court
ruled that any limits on the amount of election-related independent expenditures by
individuals violate the First Amendment.61 I regret that the Court took the next step
in Citizens United, but that step does not inevitably flow from Virginia Pharmacy,
and so my regret is quite small and one for which I am willing to take a little, but not
very much, responsibility.62
IV. THE SPEECH TAIL WAGGING THE CONDUCT DOG
To me, the single most regrettable misuse of the commercial speech doctrine has
occurred in those cases, to which I now turn, in which a limitation on speech is a
small part of a larger regulatory program, but the speech element enabled the
business challenger to accomplish through the back door what would be seen as an
improper substantive due process challenge if made directly. Because the right of
pharmacists to reduce their prices as a form of competition was not at issue, there
could be no claim that the speech ban at issue in Virginia Pharmacy was a disguised
substantive due process challenge to an underlying ban on conduct.
The first of these regulatory speech cases is Thompson v. Western States Medical
Center.63 Under a 1997 amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
there is a specific exemption for “compounded drugs” from the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration’s (FDA) standard drug approval process.64 It applies “as long as the
providers of those drugs abide by several restrictions, including that they refrain from
advertising or promoting particular compounded drugs.”65 As the Court described
the practice, “[c]ompounding is typically used to prepare medications that are not
commercially available, such as medication for a patient who is allergic to an ingre-
dient in a mass-produced product.”66 The parties agreed that the reason for the advertis-
ing ban was to prevent businesses from making large quantities of the compounds,
which then might be substituted—perhaps inappropriately—for the prescribed
59 See id. at 371–72.
60 424 U.S. 1, 44–51 (1976) (per curiam).
61 Id. at 39, 51.
62 The extension of Buckley from individuals to corporations has not been the major cause
of the massive influx of millions of dollars into recent elections. Rather, most of that money
is coming from individuals, not corporations, and that can only be reversed if that part of
Buckley is narrowed. Alan B. Morrison, McCutcheon v. FEC and Roberts v. Breyer: They’re
Both Right and They’re Both Wrong, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.acslaw
.org/publications/issue-briefs/mccutcheon-v-fec-and-roberts-v-breyer-theyre-both-right-and
-theyre-both [https://perma.cc/R6H8-V8HX].
63 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
64 Id. at 360 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 353a (2000)).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 361.
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drug.67 There was no effort to discourage the use of drugs compounded to meet the
needs of an individual; indeed, the exemption shows that Congress’s intent was quite
the opposite.68 Nonetheless, the Court struck down the ban on advertising, even though
it was there only to assure that compounding of drugs was properly controlled.69
Despite the speech-based conclusion of the majority, Justice Breyer, in dissent
for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, saw the two parts
as inextricably intertwined: “I do not believe that Congress could have achieved its
safety objectives in significantly less restrictive ways.”70 Although the majority
suggested that there were other means of achieving the safety goals of the law,71 its
suggestions involved difficult to enforce limits on drug production.72 Moreover, the
majority failed to suggest any non-safety related reason why Congress imposed the
ban, or why the Court’s judgment on how to protect the public should trump that of
Congress.73 To be sure, patients might learn that a particular compound was avail-
able, but they could not use that information unless they had a prescription for it,
making any gain in useful information for the consumer quite marginal.
Perhaps the most far-reaching of the cases in which commercial speech was
used to set aside a regulatory scheme is Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.74 Vermont’s Pre-
scription Confidentiality Law,75 which was enacted to protect the privacy of prescribing
physicians from drug detailers (sales reps), provided that, absent the prescribing
doctor’s consent, prescriber-identifying information may not be sold by pharmacies
and similar entities, or disclosed by those entities for marketing purposes, or used
for marketing by pharmaceutical manufacturers.76 The plaintiffs were data miners
who bought data from pharmacies and sold it to drug manufacturers, some of whom
joined as plaintiffs.77 On one side, Vermont argued “that its prohibitions safeguard
medical privacy and diminish the likelihood that marketing will lead to prescription
decisions not in the best interests of patients or the State.”78 The plaintiffs countered
that “[k]nowledge of a physician’s prescription practices—called ‘prescriber-identifying
information’—enables a detailer better to ascertain which doctors are likely to be
interested in a particular drug and how best to present a particular sales message.”79
67 See id. at 362.
68 See id. at 364–65.
69 Id. at 371; see also id. at 360–65.
70 Id. at 385 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 372 (majority opinion).
72 Id. at 385–86 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
73 See id. at 386.
74 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
75 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631 (2010); Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 558–59.
76 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 558–61.
77 Id. at 561.
78 Id. at 557.
79 Id. at 558.
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The two arguments sounded like a routine debate over the proper balance between
privacy and patients’ safety, on the one hand, versus the ability to market a useful and
legal product on the other. But the trump card once again was commercial speech. The
basis for invoking commercial speech is that the law “bars pharmaceutical manufac-
turers and pharmaceutical marketers from using prescriber-identifying information
for marketing, again absent the prescriber’s consent.”80 The data could be sold for
other purposes, but it seems unlikely that anyone would pay for prescriber specific
data, nor is it clear what use it would be outside of the drug detailer context. Read-
ing the majority opinion, I sensed that the majority thought that the law did not serve
a legitimate purpose—protecting doctors from being asked questions by detailers
whom they could simply refuse to see—and was able to use the speech suppressing
aspect as a basis for striking it down, without invoking substantive due process.
In dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, saw the law
differently: “In my view, this effect on expression is inextricably related to a lawful
governmental effort to regulate a commercial enterprise. The First Amendment does
not require courts to apply a special ‘heightened’ standard of review when reviewing
such an effort.”81 His dissent further argued as follows:
To apply a strict First Amendment standard virtually as a
matter of course when a court reviews ordinary economic regu-
latory programs (even if that program has a modest impact upon
a firm’s ability to shape a commercial message) would work at
cross-purposes with this more basic constitutional approach.
Since ordinary regulatory programs can affect speech, particu-
larly commercial speech, in myriad ways, to apply a “heightened”
First Amendment standard of review whenever such a program
burdens speech would transfer from legislatures to judges the
primary power to weigh ends and to choose means, threatening
to distort or undermine legitimate legislative objectives.82
If, as I argued and the Court held in Virginia Pharmacy, commercial speech should
be judged based in part on whether the information being conveyed is useful to the
listener, the majority’s decision in Sorrell is mistaken. The supposed listeners are
the doctors,83 who know what they have been prescribing or could easily find out.
It is mainly because they are not prescribing what the detailers are selling that they
are being “provided” the information about their prescribing practices.84 Whatever
else underlies Sorrell, it is not a concern that the recipients of the information at
80 Id. at 559.
81 Id. at 581 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 584–85.
83 See id. at 557–58 (majority opinion).
84 See id.
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issue are kept in the dark against their will. Justice Breyer does not directly accuse the
majority of bringing back substantive due process under a First Amendment veil,85
but that is the import of his dissent.
Another example of the speech tail wagging the conduct dog is U.S. West, Inc.
v. FCC.86 The relevant statute forbade telecommunications companies from dissemi-
nating or using consumer privacy information without the consent of the customer.87
The FCC decided that affirmative approval (opt in) by the consumer was needed,
whereas the company wanted only opt out, which would have meant many more
customers would have “consented.”88 It argued that the failure to permit opt out was
an unconstitutional infringement on its First Amendment rights to engage in com-
mercial speech.89 A divided Court of Appeals agreed with the challengers, citing
Virginia Pharmacy.90 Judge Brisco in dissent responded that the opt-out method
would not meet the statutory goals of privacy protection because “unlike the opt-in
method, [it] does not guarantee that a customer will make an informed decision
about usage of his or her individually identifiable [customer proprietary network
information].”91 It is difficult to fathom the basis for concluding that the difference
between an opt-in and an opt-out approval process, in order to protect customer pri-
vacy, can rise to the level of a First Amendment issue simply because the person that
obtains any such approval will be disseminating the customer’s presumptively pri-
vate information and is doing so for a commercial purpose.92
The most serious problem resulting from focusing on speech, when the main
issue is regulation of conduct, may be the decision in United States v. Caronia.93
The case can be read narrowly to turn on the definition of a misbranded drug and/or
the choice of the United States to charge the defendant with promoting a drug for
an unapproved use by statements that he made regarding the drug,94 instead of charg-
ing him with the more difficult to prove intent to distribute a drug for an unapproved
use.95 But for purposes of this Essay, I want to assume the worst regarding the court’s
expansion of the commercial speech doctrine.
Again, the speech at issue was inextricably intertwined with the substantive regu-
lation here, by the FDA of new drugs.96 Under the law, a manufacturer must submit
85 See id. at 602–03 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1213 (2000).
87 47 U.S.C. § 222 (1996); U.S. West, Inc., 182 F.3d at 1228.
88 U.S. West, Inc., 182 F.3d at 1230.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 1232 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 760 (1976)).
91 Id. at 1247 (Brisco, J., dissenting).
92 See id. at 1246–47.
93 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
94 Id. at 152.
95 See id. at 173 n.4 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 154–55 (majority opinion).
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evidence that a new drug is both safe for use and that it is effective before it can be
marketed.97 Aside from Congress’s desire that patients not spend money for drugs
that do not work,98 it is well-recognized that virtually all drugs have some adverse
side effects. Therefore, Congress concluded, if the drug is not effective for the disease
for which it is prescribed, the risks outweigh the benefits, which means that manu-
facturers may not promote the drug for that disease.99 The proof required for FDA
approval includes clinical testing on patients that is very time consuming and ex-
pensive, and so often manufacturers will obtain initial approval for only one use and
one patient population, which may exclude the very young and the very old.100 As a
result, a manufacturer cannot promote the use of that drug for an unapproved (known
as “off label”) use.101 If, however, a manufacturer could promote additional uses
without doing the testing, it would have no incentive to spend the money to do so,
other than a fear that it could be sued for harm caused by unapproved uses.102
One final significant fact is that the federal law does not preclude a doctor from
prescribing a drug for off-label use because doctors are not subject to any aspect of
the federal laws dealing with the drug approval process and are instead regulated by
the states.103 One of the main means by which doctors learn about unapproved uses
of prescription drugs is by reading independent scientific or medical journals or by
attending legitimate conferences at which those uses are discussed.104 Statements made
in those contexts are not considered by the FDA to be the improper promotion of a drug
for an unapproved use, even if made by the drug’s manufacturer.105 But the FDA has
drawn the line when the company’s detailers—the people who visited the doctors in
Sorrell and wanted to discuss the doctor’s prescribing habits106—attempt to promote
off-label uses by trying to persuade the doctors, who alone can prescribe a drug, to do
so for those off-label uses.107 That is what the record clearly shows Mr. Caronia did.108
In reversing Mr. Caronia’s conviction based on his promotional statements for
unapproved uses, the court relied heavily on Sorrell, noting that “off-label drug
usage is not unlawful”109 because doctors can legally write prescriptions for such
97 Id. at 153 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012)).
98 See id. at 180 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
99 See id. at 154–55 (majority opinion).
100 See id. at 153, 156–57.
101 Id. at 152–53.
102 See id. at 154–55.
103 See Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1179–81 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev’d on other
grounds, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
104 See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166–67.
105 Id. at 167.
106 See 564 U.S. 552, 557–58 (2011).
107 See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 152–53.
108 Id. at 156–57; see also id. at 172–74 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 166 (majority opinion).
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uses and patients may lawfully take the drug.110 The court could also have noted that
the manufacturer was permitted to sell as much of the drug as it was able to do. The
problem with those claims is that they overlook the fact that the manufacturer for
which the defendant worked could not lawfully promote that drug for that improper
use,111 which is what the law forbids and for which he was convicted.112
Second, the court relied on Virginia Pharmacy when it accused the Government
of behaving paternalistically by denying patients “potentially relevant treatment infor-
mation; such barriers to information about off-label use could inhibit, to the public’s
detriment, informed and intelligent treatment decisions.”113 That assertion contains
an implicit assumption that the court may determine what information is “relevant”
to a patient’s “informed and intelligent” treatment and to a doctor’s decision about
what to prescribe, not Congress or the FDA. The court did not appear to challenge
the legality of forbidding a manufacturer from promoting a drug for off-label use,114
but never explained how else that unlawful promotion is to occur except through the
written or spoken word.115 Or perhaps this is another case in which the court is telling
Congress, “You have a choice: you can forbid doctors from prescribing off-label uses,
in which case the promotion ban is valid, or you can continue to allow doctors to
prescribe off label, but also allow the manufacturer to promote off-label uses.” Posadas
would not have required that Hobson’s choice, but would have allowed the govern-
ment to discourage conduct of which it did not approve, by restricting advertising about
it, without having to ban it entirely.116 Perhaps that would have been a better option,
especially where the advertising (here the detailer promotion to doctors) provided
little or no information that was not readily available elsewhere and, in this case,
from more reliable sources, such as medical journals and scientific conferences.117
Other plaintiffs have sought to apply the First Amendment very broadly to strike
down the reach of some occupational licensing laws. As part of our efforts at Public
Citizen to increase the availability and affordability of “legal” services, we repre-
sented a number of individuals who were not lawyers and were charged with the
unauthorized practice of law. In some cases, they gave advice, and in others they
filled in forms or used existing pleadings as models. Because they were speaking
and writing, they could argue that they were exercising First Amendment rights. The
speech might be commercial if the speaker was paid (much less than a lawyer), but
110 Id. at 165.
111 See id. at 154.
112 Id. at 161.
113 Id. at 166 (emphasis added) (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
114 See id. at 166–67.
115 Id.
116 See generally Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986),
abrogated by 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (plurality opinion).
117 See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166–67.
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not if the advice or papers were given without charge. My own conclusion was that the
state had a right to regulate conduct, of which speech was a significant part, without
stepping on the speaker’s First Amendment rights, because I thought—perhaps
wrongly in light of some of these cases—that a First Amendment claim would not
stand up.
Of course, the fact that a state can constitutionally prohibit some kinds of advice
giving, such as the unauthorized practice of law, does not mean that it should. The
First Amendment argument is even more starkly presented in cases involving licensing
of tour guides, but so far the courts have not accepted it, even when the speech is
made for a commercial purpose.118 However, in Edwards v. District of Columbia,119
although the plaintiff conceded that the District of Columbia could constitutionally
license tour guides who were paid for their services, they objected to the require-
ment that they had to pass a one hundred question exam on the sights of the Nation’s
Capital.120 The court found that the examination rule violated the First Amendment,121
and the case was ultimately dismissed as moot when the District repealed the of-
fending examination requirement.122 I do not oppose all occupational licensing schemes,
but think that many, such as those involving the unauthorized practice of law, as
well as some portions of those governing tour guides, are far too expansive.123
Finally, a recent appellate decision illustrates the manner in which incidental
and probably inevitable speech made in a commercial transaction can enable those
who disagree with a law regulating that transaction to obtain relief under the com-
mercial speech doctrine. In Dana’s Railroad Supply v. Attorney General of Florida,124
several retailers challenged Florida’s statute governing the manner in which a seller
could charge a higher price for a customer who pays with a credit card instead of
cash.125 Florida insisted that merchants only give discounts for cash, instead of imposing
surcharges for using credit cards,126 presumably because the legislature concluded
that it would be fairer and more transparent to the customer. The retailer alleged that
controlling the statements made in such transactions infringed on his right to engage
in commercial speech, and a 2–1 court agreed127: “The fate of Florida’s no-surcharge
law hinges on a single determination: whether the law regulates speech—triggering
118 Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 753 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
1403 (2015).
119 755 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
120 Id. at 999.
121 Id. at 998.
122 Edwards v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 14-7199, 2015 WL 5237417, at *1 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 19, 2015).
123 See Alan B. Morrison, Defining the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Some New Ways
of Looking at an Old Question, 4 NOVA L.J. 363 (1980).
124 807 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 8, 2016) (No. 15-1482).
125 Id. at 1239.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1239–41.
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First Amendment scrutiny—or whether it regulates conduct—subject only to rational-
basis review as a mine-run economic regulation.”128 The dissent disagreed: “Pre-
scribing when a business can add an additional amount to its price controls the
timing of conduct and not the speech describing that conduct. The Supreme Court has
long held that the government can regulate economic conduct—including the prices
charged by merchants—without violating the First Amendment.”129 The State filed
a petition for certiorari,130 in which it pointed to two recent court of appeals deci-
sions that reached the opposite result: Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman,131
and Rowell v. Pettijohn.132 On September 29, 2016, the Court granted certiorari in
Expressions Hair Design,133 which was the first petition filed. This will present the
Justices with an opportunity to clarify the speech-versus-conduct conflict, and perhaps
even cut back on an overly expansive use of the commercial speech doctrine—one
that I surely could not have anticipated, but for which I have some regrets.
CONCLUSION
As I have tried to show, generally the courts have faithfully followed the commer-
cial speech doctrine and not produced results for which I have regrets as its originator.
But not in all cases, and so I must confess to having some regrets, with the hope that
not all of them will remain good law.
128 Id. at 1241.
129 Id. at 1257 (Carnes, J., dissenting) (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 504–09 (1996) (plurality opinion)).
130 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bondi v. Dona’s R.R. Supply, No. 15-1482 (U.S. June 6,
2016).
131 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed (U.S. May 16, 2016) (No. 15-1391).
Judge Livingston, who was the dissenter in Caronia, wrote the opinion upholding the law
in Expressions Hair Design. Id. at 121.
132 816 F.3d 73 (5th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 3, 2016) (No. 15-1455).
133 Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d 118, cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
